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Antonin

Zapotocky, now Czechoslovak Prime Minister.

1. In 1945, Zapotocky [REDACTED] was convinced that world peace would exist for a considerable period of time, even though the economic prospects facing European nations were not especially bright, and that it would depend on the degree of aid which would be given Europe by the United States. He emphasized that the Czechoslovak economy must first of all be put on its feet by a domestic effort, because it was wrong to assume that the nation would get something for nothing from the United States or even from the Soviet Union. Zapotocky further emphasized that one definite result of World War II was a great strengthening of socialism, as was evident from the outcome of the elections in France and Great Britain. He was very interested at that time in the development of a strong World Federation of Trade Unions. He felt that through this organization it would be possible to gain some political power in states where socialism was not organized politically and where the existing trade union organizations should be the exponents of the socialist concept. He therefore urged that the post of social attache be created at Czechoslovak missions abroad. The task of these social attaches was to have been to maintain personal contact with the leading personalities of trade union organizations, pass appropriate propaganda material to them, follow their political policies, and study social-political problems in the countries where they were stationed, utilizing these studies for the purpose of furthering the cause of socialism. The leaders of Czechoslovakia's Central Trade Union Council (URO) desired to have such attaches named to the United States, France, Mexico, India, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. Jan Masaryk at that time agreed with Zapotocky's proposal, and the government approved the plan, but it was not put into operation for financial as well as political reasons.

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2. Ever since 1945, Zapotocky supported the concept that the basis of all Czechoslovak foreign policy must be friendship with the USSR, because the great majority of the Czechoslovak people, after the sad experiences of Munich, did not trust the West to the extent they had during the days of the First Republic. Therefore, the secretariats of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement (ROH) were instructed to exploit "Munich" in all propaganda activity as one of the most impressive arguments in favor of the necessity of close Czechoslovak-Soviet unity. Interestingly enough, Zapotocky believed in 1945 and 1946 that Czechoslovakia could also contribute to the rapprochement of the West and the USSR by showing that even a country building socialism could cooperate closely with capitalistic states in international politics. Zapotocky's position was similar to that of Jan Masaryk, who used to refer to Czechoslovakia as the bridge between the West and the East. As is known, this concept was definitely abandoned after 1948 and labeled reactionary.
3. Like all other Czechoslovak politicians, irrespective of their political orientation, Zapotocky agreed with the unconditional expulsion of Sudeten Germans. He was, however, at that time already aware of the fact that such a move would have certain unfavorable economic consequences for Czechoslovakia since it would be very difficult to replace some expelled specialists. He successfully maintained that it would be foolish to transfer all of these specialists at a time when replacements for them were not available. He favored the policy of keeping them in Czechoslovakia and paying them well until the time when replacements of equal skill were available. (Thus, for example, the adviser of the general manager of the Poldi Steel Works at Kladno,³ Humelberger, was allowed to remain in his position; his villa was returned to him, and he was paid a monthly salary of Kcs 20,000.)
- many errors had been committed in the population transfer. The German specialists who had been transferred either to the Western zone, or to the Soviet zone, were used in both zones for the quick reconstruction of several industries which had been Czechoslovak specialties (glass, porcelain, stainless steel, toys, artificial industrial materials). As a typical example Zapotocky pointed to Dr. Ing. Pattermann from the Poldi plant in Kladno, who had been the greatest Czechoslovak expert in the special steel for which the Poldi Works had been world-famous. Pattermann received assistance in leaving Czechoslovakia and now works as a manager for an Austrian steel company.⁴
5. Vladimir Clementis initially held the same point of view regarding the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia as Zapotocky did with regard to the expulsion of Germans. Later, however, he was obliged to change his position as a result of Moscow pressure. Up to the time of the installation of the Communist regime in Hungary, not one Czechoslovak political figure publicly disagreed with the proposal to expel the Hungarian minority from Czechoslovakia. It was not until Communism triumphed in Hungary that an about-face occurred in the thinking of Czechoslovak government officials who, under pressure from the Soviet Union, retreated from their original demands and gave their assent to the creation of a legal Hungarian minority, which would be guaranteed Hungarian schools and would be granted all the rights to which Czechoslovak citizens were entitled.⁵
6. Regarding relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland, Zapotocky in 1948 deplored the fact that these relations are not what they should be, especially in the field of economic cooperation.

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- 25X1 7. [] in 1951, Zapotocky gave careful consideration to the
 25X1 existing international situation.⁶ He asked what opinions prevailed in
 25X1 the West about the possibility of a new World War. He was surprised [] 25X1
 25X1 that, [] the war psychosis in Italy was not as great
 25X1 as in Czechoslovakia. [] 25X1
 [] he personally did not expect an armed conflict in the foreseeable
 future, but in view of the tense international situation it was not possible
 to assume categorically that such a conflict could not break out. Against
 the possibility of war, Zapotocky cited the sad experiences of the United
 States in China and in Korea, and the general antipathy toward war in the
 capitalistic states in Europe, especially in Italy and in France. He added
 that if war broke out there was no doubt that all of Europe would be rapidly
 occupied by the Soviet Army and that a very important role in facilitating
 this occupation would be played by the Communist parties in Italy and France
 which would create second fronts immediately upon the start of hostilities.
 The war would last a very long time (Zapotocky said it would be a Thirty
 Years War), and the outcome would be doubtful regardless of who won, since
 devastation would be extensive and reconstruction would require a long period
 of time.
8. Zapotocky felt that the United States had the economic capability to wage a
 long war, but doubted that the American people could bear the psychological
 strain of a long war and could avoid panic during the first air bombardments.
 He believed that the entire foreign policy of the United States is directed
 by Wall Street, which is interested chiefly in the preservation of the present
 artificial industrial boom. If armament production was to be stopped American
 industry would find itself in a deep economic crisis. When the question of
 war or peace is considered under these circumstances, the possibility of a
 conflict cannot be excluded. Because of the other factors cited above,
 however, it was possible to hope that war would not break out.
9. As examples of the great harm that the economic boycott by the United States
 had caused to the Czechoslovak economy, Zapotocky cited the stoppage of the
 delivery of technical equipment for the Czechoslovak steel industry which
 had been paid for in advance, and the export embargo on replacement parts
 for the Czechoslovak penicillin factory, which forces Czechoslovakia to buy
 these through Switzerland at a cost of about three times their normal value.
10. Concerning Czechoslovak relations with Western nations, Zapotocky stated
 that these relations must be based on strict reciprocity, since such a policy
 had had the desired effect in a number of instances. He admitted, however,
 that Czechoslovak relations with the West were growing steadily worse.

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- 25X1 3. [] Comment: Now the Poldina hut plant of the United Steelworks
 National Corporation (SONP). 25X1
- 25X1 4. [] Comment: Up to 1951, production at the Poldina hut plant in Kladno was
 not yet equal in quality to prewar and war production. []
 the difficulties in steel production are due, on the one hand, to a shortage
 of necessary alloys, an ever present problem, secondly, to the indifferent
 attitude prevailing among workmen, and, finally, to the fact that Patterman
 had certain secrets of production which have not as yet been uncovered.

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5. Comment: the Slovak minority in Hungary was It certainly would be interesting to compare the status of these two groups in regard to rights in and obligations to the respective states under which they live. Today, there is no official or unofficial discussion of this problem in Czechoslovakia.

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